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UNIONS WITHOUT MAJORITY-A BLACK HOLE?
CLYDE SUMMERS*
In 1935 Congress proclaimed basic rights of American workers in
the sweeping words of section 7 of the Wagner Act:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join and
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities,
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and
protection.I
The fundamental quality of this section as the tap-root and trunk of
the statute was underlined by section 8(1), which declared: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by section 7."
Other unfair labor practices only elaborated on the all-inclusive words of
section 8(l); all were protections of the basic right of section 7. The Taft-
Hartley Act did not change the fundamental role of section 7 in the stat-
utory scheme; it remained the tap-root and trunk, with the rest of the
statute life-supporting branches.
Over the years, this centrality of section 7 has been obscured by
increased focus on section 9, which was worded and intended only to
make more effective one form of expressing the section 7 right to bargain
collectively. Section 9(a) provides that "representatives selected by a ma-
jority of employees in a bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representa-
tive, for purposes of collective bargaining of all employees in the
bargaining unit." The rest of section 9 provides the standards and proce-
dures for determining whether a union is entitled to the special status as
exclusive representative.
At this point, it is crucial to emphasize that section 9(a), by its
words and purpose, does no more than give special status to a majority
union. It in no way derogates from the section 7 rights of a union with-
out a majority when there is no exclusive representative. Section 9 has
commonly been characterized as adopting the principle of "majority
rule," without recognizing that its limited role is to give a majority union
the status of exclusive representation. This uncritical use of "majority
rule' has fostered an unarticulated assumption that when a union lacks a
* Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
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majority the employers and the union are not entitled to the full measure
of section 7 rights. These rights are lost in a black hole.
That false assumption was articulated by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in Sears, Roebuck & Co. 2 An employee in a plant where the
union did not have a majority was summoned to a disciplinary interview.
He requested the presence of his union representative, but this request
was rejected on the grounds the workers did not have a majority union.
The Board conceded that the employee was engaged in concerted action
and that if the union had majority status denying him this request would
be an unfair labor practice under the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB
v. J. Weingarten, Inc.3 The Board, however, reasoned that "[w]hen no
union is present," granting him this right "wreak havoc with fundamen-
tal provisions of the Act." "[T]o place a Weingarten representative in a
nonunion setting is to require the employer to recognize and deal with
the equivalent of a union representative, contrary to the Act's exclusivity
principle."' 4 An employee who refused to go to such an interview with-
out a fellow employee could be discharged. The core of the Board's rea-
soning is that when a union lacks a majority, "no union is present."
There is a black hole of no union rights.
Later the Board shifted its rationale. It declared that where there
was not a majority union, "the interests in assuring such representation
under section 7 are less numerous and less weighty than the interests
apparent in the union setting."'5 Starting from the assumed premise that
without a majority union there is no "union setting," the Board dis-
counted the employees' section 7 rights. It disregarded the fact that
when there is no majority union the employee's need for presence of a
representative is much greater. The disciplinary interview is the last and
only chance to present the employee's case; there is no subsequent griev-
ance procedure or arbitration to protect his interests. 6 Regardless of its
rationale, the Board's result is clear: an employee's section 7 rights will
be given less protection when the union lacks a majority.
Unions, by their focus on organization campaigns for the purpose of
winning elections, have helped foster the assumption that a union with-
out a majority have no significant role to play. The dominant, if not
2. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985), overruled by E.I. du Point de Memours & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627
(1988).
3. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
4. 274 N.L.R.B. at 232.
5. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630 (1988).
6. For a penetrating analysis of this series of cases, see Morris, NLRB Protection in the Non-
Union Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673,
1730-50 (1989).
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exclusive, emphasis in organizing is not to increase membership, but to
obtain majority status. Indeed, during an organizational campaign em-
ployees are commonly not asked to join the union, but only to sign cards
authorizing the union to represent them. The objective is to obtain the
status of exclusive representative through voluntary recognition by the
employer or through a Board election. If the union fails in this objective,
it commonly assumes that it has no continuing role except, perhaps, to
try again another year. Unions, thereby, tacitly accept the Board's char-
acterization that if they are not the exclusive representative they have no
representation function. In the absence of a majority, the union is not
"present" in the plant.
The union's perspective that the election campaign is a life and
death struggle is not only shared, but embraced, by employers. It makes
the life of the union dependent on the outcome of an election where the
employer has crucial advantages, especially under existing Board deci-
sions. First, the employer can compel a union to seek an election by
simply refusing to accept authorization cards as evidence of majority sta-
tus, regardless of the number of cards.7 Second, the employer can use a
wide variety of procedural devices to delay the election giving time to
mount an intensive and extended anti-union campaign. The longer the
election is delayed, the less the union's chance of winning.8 Third, the
employer has built-in advantages in the campaign through its ability to
interrogate employees, hold captive audience speeches, distribute litera-
ture, compel foremen to campaign against the union, and gain access to
the public media. In addition, the employer's control over jobs and the
workplace enables it to make fear-provoking "predictions," to lead em-
ployees to believe that future promotion may depend on their attitude
toward the union, and to threaten to go out of business.9 If the employer
stumbles or deliberately steps across the boundary into illegal threats or
coercion, the worst that can happen is that a new election will be ordered
months later. The employer gains added time to campaign, using the
same devices and the same statements more subtly worded, with the em-
ployees remembering and reading in the past coercion. Even overtly dis-
criminatory discharges which ultimately lead to reinstatement and back
pay may cost the employer less than a union victory in the election.
When the union loses the election, it commonly abandons the field,
seldom attempting to maintain a functioning organization in the plant,
7. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
8. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1795-1803 (1983).
9. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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except where there is hope that the union can mount a winning campaign
the next year. The union ceases to exist as an organization representing
the interests of those who supported it, and leaves the local leaders in the
plant who declared their support of the union to the tender mercies of the
employer. The unspoken assumption of both the union and the employer
is that when the election is lost there will be no exercise of section 7
rights. All that is left is a black hole.
It is this assumption, that unions without majorities have no signifi-
cant role under the statute, which I want to address, for my point here is
that the union's life need not depend on winning elections. First, I want
to map out the potential legal rights and status of non-majority unions
under the statute. Most of this is well known terrain, though too seldom
travelled by unions. Second, I want to suggest the range of practical
possibilities for unions without majorities to represent and serve the in-
terests of workers in the workplace.
I. LEGAL STATUS OF UNIONS WITHOUT A MAJORITY
Section 7, by its terms, makes no distinction between a union with a
majority and a union without a majority. Indeed, the rights guaranteed
in section 7 are expressed in terms of rights of employees, and may be
exercised with or without a union. Section 9(a) qualifies or limits the
exercise of section 7 rights by employees or minority unions only when
there is a majority union with exclusive representation rights.
A. Protected Concerted Activity
It has been a truism, at least since Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB,' 0 that during an organizational campaign employees have the
right- to wear union steward buttons, to distribute union literature, and to
solicit union membership on the plant premises, absent special circum-
stances. The right to distribute literature and solicit membership, the
Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., II extends to a
minority union even where a majority union is present and the collective
agreement prohibits such activity.
These rights do not depend on the union's having or even seeking
majority status, but flow from section 7 rights "to form, join or assist
labor organization." Thus, in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,' 2 the Supreme
Court held that the right to distribute literature extended to distribution
10. 324 U.S. 793 (1934), reh'g denied sub nom. NLRB v. Le Tomeau Co., 325 U.S. 894 (1945).
11. 415 U.S. 322 (1974), reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974).
12. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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of a newsletter urging employees to write letters to legislators to oppose a
"right-to-work" provision and criticizing the President for vetoing an in-
crease in the minimum wage. The newsletter urged employees to register
to vote with the appeal, "[a]s working men and women we must defeat
our enemies and elect our friends." This distribution of political litera-
ture was protected, not because it was made by a majority union or re-
lated to its function as exclusive representative, but because it was found
by the Board to come within the section 7 right "to engage in ... con-
certed activities for... mutual aid or protection."
Similarly, the right to be a member of a union protects equally mem-
bership in minority and majority unions, for section 7 makes no distinc-
tion as to which union an employee has a right "to form, join and assist."
Again, there is a protected right to support and join a minority, whether
or not a majority union is present.' 3
Most importantly, the right to strike or picket for better terms and
conditions of employment can be exercised by a union or even by an
informal group, at least in the absence of a recognized majority union. In
the first year of the statute, the Board held that an employee who left
work and solicited others to leave work to protest the discharge of a
fellow employee was engaged in protected concerted activity.14 In an-
other early case, nine garment workers, whose request for an increased
piece rate was refused, sat down at their benches and did no work for the
rest of the day. At quitting time they were given their paychecks and
told not to come back to work. This stoppage by a small group in a large
shop was held protected by section 7 and they were ordered reinstated. 15
The line of cases which followed 16 was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co. 17 In that case seven machinists
walked out, refusing to work in an unheated and bitterly cold shop.
When they refused to return until heat was provided they were dis-
charged. The Court stated that it was not necessary for there to be any
formal organization but only that they act in concert. They might be
replaced, but they could not be discharged.
Sketching of these section 7 rights which may be exercised by em-
13. Section 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) permit a union security clause which requires an individual to
support financially the majority union's collective bargaining function, NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Pattern Makers
League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
14. National New York Packing & Shipping Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1936).
15. Matter of Indianapolis Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 231 (1938).
16. See, e.g., Stehli & Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1939); Ryan Car Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 139 (1940);
Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 N.L.R.B. 347 (1940); Spandico Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942
(1942); NLRB v. Kennametal, 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950).
17. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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ployees and a non-majority union may seem unnecessary, for they are
well-known and undisputed. However, preoccupation with organiza-
tional campaigns culminating in elections which, if lost, is considered a
requiem for the union, have pushed out of mind the legal rights which
survive the loss.
B. Collective Bargaining by Non-Majority Unions
Focus on section 9(a) fosters the unthinking generalization that non-
majority unions have no right or legal status to represent employees in
collective bargaining. When there is no majority union, this is-patently
incorrect in three respects. First, a non-majority union, or any group of
employees, has a legally protected right to present demands and request
negotiations. In the first year of the statute, a committeeman of a union
which did not represent a majority was discharged for seeking to negoti-
ate reinstatement of a discharged employee. The Board held that the
committeeman was exercising rights protected by section 7 and could not
be discharged.' 8 If the employer refuses to negotiate, the union can
strike and the strike will be protected activity. The strikers have the
same rights as strikers by a majority union; they may be replaced, but
they can not be discharged.
Second, individual employees can refuse to discuss terms and condi-
tions of employment with the employer and insist that any negotiations
must be with their union representative, even though the union does not
have a majority. Section 7 guarantees the right to bargain through "rep-
resentatives of their own choosing." The employer may be free to act
unilaterally without discussion, but it cannot discharge the employee for
refusal to bargain individually.
Third, a non-majority union can bargain and make a collective
agreement for its own members. This has been recognized by the
Supreme Court from the first days of the Wagner Act. 19 In Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 20 the Union was allowed to act as the bargaining
representative for the employees who were members, even though they
lacked a majority. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this in Int'l Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB21 where Mr. Justice Douglas in dis-
sent stated, "We have indicated over and again that, absent an exclusive
18. Cleveland Chair Co., I N.L.R.B. 892, 903 (1936).
19. Virginia Ry. v. System Fed. No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 549 (1937).
20. 305 U.S. 197 (1938). "[Iln the absence of such an exclusive agency the employees repre-
sented by the Brotherhood, even if they were a minority, clearly had a right to make their own
choice." Id. at 237.
21. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
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agency for bargaining created by a majority of workers, a minority union
has standing to bargain for its members. ' 22 Such members-only con-
tracts are legally enforceable in the federal courts because section 301 of
Taft-Hartley applies to all "suits between unions and employers," with
no limitation to majority Status of the union.
Members-only contracts have played a significant role in our history
of collective bargaining. 23 The earliest agreements of the Iron Molders
Union in the stove industry included provisions applicable to employers
where the union lacked a majority.24 A similar pattern was followed in
the glass industry.25 In 1900 when the Mine Workers called a strike in
the anthracite coal industry, it had only 8,000 members among 140,000
miners. 26 The Anthracite Coal Commission, convened to settle the
strike, made an award which expressly rejected exclusive representation
but made the resulting agreement binding only on union members. 27
Members-only contracts continued to be used after the passage of the
Wagner Act. The first agreement between the United Auto Workers and
General Motors was, by its terms, applicable only to union members; 28
and the recognition agreement in 1937 between John L. Lewis and My-
ron Taylor, President of U.S. Steel, did not accept majority rule but rec-
ognized the union as representative for members only.
29
Recognition of non-majority unions remains an accepted device in
our collective bargaining system. The Meyer-Milias-Brown Act gov-
erning public sector bargaining in California provides for non-exclusive
representation. 30 Executive Order 10988, issued in 1962 to establish col-
lective bargaining by federal employees, required formal recognition of a
union having a substantial and stable membership of no less than 10%
where no other union was qualified for exclusive recognition. 3' In 1969,
22. Id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Although this statement was made in a dissenting
opinion, it was accepted by the majority which found that the union committed an unfair labor
practice because, while a minority, attempted to act as an exclusive representative, making a contract
which purported to cover all employees.
23. Majority rule was not an established principle in determining union representation in the
19th century. It all depended on the union's show of economic strength. M. DERBER, THE AMERI-
CAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1865-1965 (1970).
24. REPORT OF UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 861-64 (1900).
25. Id. at 830, 898-900.
26. S. PERLMAN & P. TAFT, 4 HISTORY OF LABOR 1896-1932 34-36 (1935).
27. REPORT OF THE ANTHRACITE COAL COMMISSION, S. DOC. No. 6, 58th Cong. Spec. Sess.
79 (1903).
28. M. DERBER, supra note 23. This was typical of the first collective agreements in the auto
industry. 20TH CENTURY FUND, How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 595 (1942).
29. 20TH CENTURY FUND, supra note 28, at 544.
30. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the
Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1971).
31. 27 C.F.R. 551 (1962).
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Executive Order 11491 eliminated the requirement of formal recognition
of minority unions but gave national consultation rights to unions repre-
senting a substantial number of employees.3 2
Section 7 thus protects officers of a non-majority union who seek to
bargain on behalf of its members; entitles employees to insist on bargain-
ing only through the union; protects employees who strike to compel an
employer to bargain with the non-majority union; and section 301 makes
a members-only contract legally enforceable.
It is commonly considered, however, that the employer has no duty
to bargain with a non-majority union, and that a strike to compel such
bargaining is not an unfair labor practice strike but an economic strike
making the strikers vulnerable to permanent replacement. 33 This conclu-
sion, however, has strikingly slim support in the words or the purposes of
the statute, or in Board or court decisions.34 Though it may be much too
late to open this question, examining it may at least suggest how our
focus on section 9 rather than on section 7 has caused us to over-read the
limited scope of majority rule.
Section 7 states as one of employees' basic rights, the right "to bar-
gain through representatives of their own choosing." It is not stated as a
qualified right to bargain through a representative of the majority's
choosing but of "their own" choosing. This is, of course, qualified by
section 9(a), but that qualification, by its terms, applies only when there
is a "representative selected by a majority." The employer's refusal to
meet and deal with a non-majority union would "interfere" with its
members' exercise of this section 7 right "to bargain through representa-
tives of their own choosing," contrary to Section 8(a)(1).
Section 8(a)(5) proscribes as an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." Again, section 9(a)
provides only that the representative selected by the majority shall be the
exclusive representative. It does not state that a union without a major-
ity is not the representative of its members for purposes of collective bar-
32. 34 C.F.R. § 17,605 (1970).
33. For an early reading of Section 9(a) as requiring an employer to bargain with a non-major-
ity union, see Latham, Legislative Purpose of the Wagner Act, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 433, 453
(1936).
34. The Board has never held that an employer can refuse to meet and bargain with a non-
majority union. In Pennypower Shopping News, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 536 (1979) and Swearingen Avia-
tion Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 228 (1976), there is only dicta by the Administrative Law Judge. In both
cases striking employees were reinstated. In Charleston Nursing Center, 257 N.L.R.B. 554 (1981),
there is dictum by the Board in a case where the Board found that the employer had not refused to
meet with the group, but had reasonably refused to meet until two days later.
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gaining. To so read section 9(a) would eviscerate the basic section 7 right
of employees "to bargain through representatives of their own choosing."
The plain words of section 7, section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(5) would
seem to require an employer, in the absence of a majority union to bar-
gain collectively with a non-majority union for its own members.
The history of the majority rule principle shows that its purpose was
not to limit the ability of a non-majority union to represent its own mem-
bers, but to protect a majority union's ability to bargain collectively. Sec-
tion 9 was built on the experience under section 7(a) of the National
Recovery Act guaranteeing employees "the right to organize and bargain
collectively." The key case under section 7(a), repeatedly referred to in
legislative reports and debates was Houde Engineering Corp.35 decided
the preceding year. In that case, the Auto Workers had won an election
but the company insisted that it was obligated to bargain also with a
minority union which was employer dominated. The Board ruled that
this frustrated the process of collective bargaining by creating division
and dissension between the two unions and ordered the employer to bar-
gain exclusively with the majority union.
In the reports and legislative debates, preceding the Wagner Act, the
arguments for majority rule were made in the context of competing un-
ions and the necessity that the majority union have exclusive authority to
negotiate for all employers.3 6 The purpose of an election was to deter-
mine which, if any, union was to be given exclusive representation rights,
thereby empowering it to represent non-consenting employees. 37 There
was no suggestion that a majority, by preferring individual bargaining,
could deprive a minority of their right to bargain collectively for them-
selves through representatives of their own choosing. 38
35. I N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934). For a previous similar case reaching the same result, see Denver
Tramway Corp., I N.L.R.B. (old) 64 (1934).
36. Although statements in congressional reports, taken out of context, seem to reject bargain-
ing with a non-majority union and members-only contracts, these statements were made with refer-
ence to bargaining by competing unions. H. REP. No. 969 on H.R. 9798, II LEG. HIST. OF NLRA,
2928 (1935); S. REP. No. 573 on S. 1958, II LEG. HisT. OF NLRA 213.
37. The Railway Labor Act, which provided the model for the National Labor Relations Act
provided in section 2(4), "The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to
determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of the Act." The
provision does not say "whether" the employees shall be represented, but "who" shall represent
them. Under the Railway Labor Act, ballots in representation elections do not include the choice of
"no union," but only the names of the competing unions. See Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks v.
Association for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
38. In Houde Engineering, the Boaid stated that its rule would not apply "where the majority
group has taken no steps toward collective bargaining or has so abused its privileges that some
minority group might justly ask the Board for appropriate relief." I N.L.R.B. (old) at 44. The
inference is that in the absence of bargaining by a majority union, there was an obligation to bargain
with a non-majority union.
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Bargaining collectively with a non-majority union for its own mem-
bers is not impracticable. Indeed, it is practiced, if not legally required,
in almost every country which has a system of free collective bargaining.
The American notion that an employer has no duty to bargain with a
union until it has obtained a majority is unknown and unthinkable in
most other countries. In those countries the collective agreement is le-
gally binding only for union members; the employer remains free to pro-
vide more, less, or different benefits to non-members and to settle their
grievances without the intervention by the non-majority union.39
To be sure economic strength of a non-majority may not be great,
and the employer might resist agreeing to benefits for members which it
was not prepared to extend to other employees. The non-majority
union's position, however, would not be significantly different from that
of a union which had a majority in a bargaining unit encompassing only
a minority of the employer's work force. Negotiation with a non-major-
ity union could serve the purpose of leading each side to understand bet-
ter the needs and desires of the other side, and help find solutions which
might be mutually accepted.- More importantly, it could provide a griev-
ance procedure to which individual employees could resort with assur-
ance of an uncompromised advocate.
We have probably proceeded too long on the questionable assump-
tion that the employer has no affirmative duty to bargain with a non-
majority union to now recognize that duty short of a statutory amend-
ment. Non-majority unions certainly cannot now rely on such a statu-
tory right. There is clearly, however, the more limited protection that a
non-majority union can represent its members, the members can refuse
to deal with the employer except through the union, and the union can
strike to induce the employer to bargain with it, to adjust a grievance, or
to make a members-only contract.
39. The employer's providing different terms for members covered by the collective agreement
and other employees not covered does not violate section 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2). Violation of section
8(a)(3) "normally turns on whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an anti-union
purpose." NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). Complying with a members-only
contract would not be so "inherently destructive of employee interests" that it "bears its own indicia
of intent," but serves a legitimate business end, particularly in view of the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of members-only contracts in Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961).
If the employer refused to give the non-majority union substantially the same benefits it gave
other employees, this might be evidence of discrimination requiring the employer to come forward
with explanations, but giving the non-majority union better terms in return for contractual stability
would carry its own justifications.
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II. PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR UNIONS WITHOUT MAJORITIES
A sketch of existing rights makes clear that a non-majority union
has a range of legal protections entitling it to maintain a visible presence
in the workplace and to represent its members in matters related to their
work. As a base, it can maintain in-plant committees which may even
meet in the plant at least briefly during non-working time. It can desig-
nate employees as union stewards, identify them with union steward but-
tons, and through them maintain contact with member and non-member
employees. Taking further advantage of Republic Aviation, its members
can distribute in the plant, in non-working areas during non-working
time, literature publicizing and protesting working conditions in the
plant and other matters related to their work situation, such as the calcu-
lation and payment of bonuses, structuring of a profit sharing plan, set-
ting of incentive rates, scheduling of vacations, operation of the credit
union, and even the selection and conduct of foremen. 40 Employer com-
munications can also be countered by a union leaflet distributed in the
workplace during non-working time. The union can, through its mem-
bers in the plant, be the voice of employees on all matters of common
concern. Under Eastex this may extend to distributing literature on
political issues related to employment issues generally, although not of
immediate concern to the employees.
Union stewards and officers may learn of grievances of fellow em-
ployees, and the in-plant committee can present those grievances to man-
agement. If management refuses to meet and discuss with the
committee, employees may leave their work as a group to request discus-
sion of the problems with management directly.41
If the employer refuses to meet and negotiate with the non-majority
union, or if the employer's response is unsatisfactory, the union may
picket 42 or engage in a stoppage or walkout.43 Although the striking em-
ployees are vulnerable to replacement, this vulnerability can be reduced
by engaging in the stoppage without notice, and offering to return to
work before the employer can install replacements. Repeated short term
40. The right to protest, as contrasted to the right to strike, is not limited to mandatory subjects
of bargaining, NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 845 (1948); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-operative, Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1960); G & W Elec. Speciality Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1965).
41. NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950).
42. Picketing, which sought to induce the employer to meet and negotiate concerning a particu-
lar grievance, would seem not to be "recognition" picketing within 8(b)(7), but rather governed by
the same rationale as "area standards" picketing. Picketing to obtain a members-only agreement
would raise a more difficult question, but it lacks the underlying reason for section 8(b)(7)-to limit
the use of economic pressure to compel unwilling employees to be represented by the union.
43. Indianapolis Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 231 (1938).
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stoppages on the same grievance may result in the Board characterizing
it as an unprotected partial or "piecemeal" strike, making the employees
subject to discharge. 44 Other devices, such as "work to rule" and sick-
outs, may be more difficult for the employer to counteract. Although
such measures create only limited economic pressure on the employer,
their potentially disruptive effect may induce the employer to discuss
problems and make a tolerable adjustment.
A non-majority union can provide the shield of "concerted activity"
for an individual employee who refuses to drive a truck with faulty
breaks, reports violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
refuses to act in violation of professional ethics or personal morality, or
sues for unpaid overtime. The individual, by making the report or pro-
test through the union, relying on established union policy or obtaining
endorsement by the union, converts his or her individual action into
"concerted activity" and obtains the protection of section 7. Where a
non-majority union exists, no employee need be vulnerable under Meyers
Industries, Inc.4 5
Although these activities by members of a non-majority union are
protected under section 7, the protection is obviously not fully effective.
Legally prohibiting the discharge of employees engaging in these activi-
ties does not necessarily prevent their discharge. It guarantees them only
a long delayed and uncertain order of reinstatement with back pay by the
Board. Not all union members are willing to take this risk. The non-
majority union unquestionably is in a relative weak economic and legal
position.
A more fruitful role for the non-majority union is to help employees
know and enforce their individual employment rights. For example,
many employees do not know the full scope of their rights under work-
men's compensation. They often do not know that injuries such as grad-
ual loss of hearing, heart attacks, facial scars and emotional problems
may be compensable. Many do not know when or how to file claims, or
how to prove them. Few realize that they may have third party tort
claims, particularly for defectively designed equipment or toxic materi-
als. The union can establish a committee within the shop to distribute
literature describing the kind of injuries covered. The committee can
44. International Union, U.A.W.A., A.F.L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
45. 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986). The Board stated that "joint employee action is the touchstone"
and that concerted activity "requires some linkage to group action." This "linkage" may be very
loose. See Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 685 (1987); Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282
N.L.R.B. 413 (1986). Morris, supra note 6, at 1716-30.
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learn of injuries by employees, help them file claims, and help gather
evidence to prove their claims. The union can provide the injured em-
ployee representation or help obtain a competent representative to pres-
ent the compensation claim, and a competent lawyer where third party
actions may be possible. Some unions have developed effective plans of
this kind, but they are established only where the union has majority
status. Such plans could as well be established by unions without
majorities.
Similarly, in-plant committees could help employees know and en-
joy the full measure of their other entitlements such as medical benefits,
sick leave, severance pay and pensions provided by employer established
plans. The union could help employees claim and collect statutory enti-
tlement such as unemployment compensation, disability pay, social se-
curity and various welfare benefits. It could consolidate suits under the
Wage-Hour Law for failure to pay the minimum wage or the required
overtime premiums where separate individual suits would not be worth
litigating.
The expansion of common-law doctrines increases individual em-
ployment rights such as the "handbook rule," reading provisions of em-
ployee manuals into employment contracts, public policy exceptions to
employment at will, implied covenants of good faith, and torts such as
outrageous conduct, defamation, and invasion of privacy create a need by
employees and an opportunity for a non-majority union to provide advice
and legal representation.
The most important potential function of a non-majority union is
enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA").
Statutory enforcement procedures provide a series of openings to a union
which establishes an active in-plant safety committee. A complaint of a
violation may be filed with OSHA by any "employee or representative of
employees," allowing formal complaints to be filed through the union. A
formal complaint triggers an inspection, and a member of the safety com-
mittee may then be allowed as a "representative of employees" to accom-
pany the inspecting compliance officer and discuss the claimed violations.
In a scheduled inspection, one not initiated by a complaint, a "represen-
tative of employees" is entitled to participate in the opening conference,
accompany the compliance officer in the "walkaround" the plant and
attend the closing conference. Although a non-majority union will not
necessarily be considered a "representative of employees," the compli-
ance officer may select a member of the safety committee to act as a
representative. If no employee representative is selected, the compliance
officer "shall consult with a reasonable number of employees concerning
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matters of safety and health in the workplace." This will give the safety
committee an opportunity to call attention to unsafe conditions in the
plant.
If the compliance officer finds violations, the non-majority union
may, in the name of an employee, contest the period of time allowed to
abate the violation as unreasonable, and can act as representative of the
named employee in the proceedings before the Occupational Safety and
Review Commission ("OSHRC"). If the employer contests the citation,
any "affected employee" has a right to intervene, and the non-majority
union can again act as representative of employees in the proceedings
before OSHRC. Although the non-majority union does not have the sta-
tus of a majority union, it can play a significant role in filing formal com-
plaints and participating in inspections. In proceedings contesting
citations before OSHRC, it can, in fact, though not in name, play the
same role as a majority union.
The safety committee can play an equally effective role in enforcing
the Hazard Communication Standard. It can file a complaint that the
employer is not properly labelling toxic substances, is failing to provide
toxic hazard training to employees, or has not prepared a written hazard
communication program. By obtaining written authorization from an
employee, the committee is entitled to access to Material Safety Data
Sheets ("MSDS") showing the chemical content of toxic substances used,
to the exposure records and medical records of employees exposed to
toxic substances, and to any analyses of such records.
The non-majority union is not limited to these procedural rights in
enforcing safety and health standards. The union may distribute litera-
ture or otherwise call the employees' attention to violations of the stan-
dards, and it may generally publicize violations by the employer.
Members of the safety committee and other union members who join in
these actions have double protection. By acting for or with their union
they are protected by section 7 of the NLRA, for they are engaging in
"concerted action ... for mutual aid and protection." In addition, they
are protected by section 11 (c) which prohibits discrimination against an
employee for exercising any rights afforded by the Act.
Under OSHA, employees can refuse to perform dangerous work
only when there is reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury
and reasonable belief that no less drastic alternative, such as seeking cor-
rection by an employer or filing a formal complaint, is practicable. A
union, majority or non-majority, by advocating or supporting an individ-
ual's refusal to work, can convert the individual's action into concerted
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action within the protection of section 7, even though it does not fall
within the limited protection of OSHA.
The central point here is that a non-majority union can represent
employees for the purposes of enforcing OSHA. It can perform substan-
tially the same functions as a majority union, except for those added
rights which might be obtained by the collective bargaining agreement.
There is neither time nor need to canvass the functions which non-
majority unions could fulfill in making real other individual employment
rights under the evolving common law or under statutes, such as plant
closure laws, pregnancy leave acts, polygraph and privacy laws, and
whistleblowing statutes. There is need, however, to point out that judi-
cially created doctrines establishing employment rights and employment
protection statutes are proliferating at a rapid rate, largely because of the
recognition that the shrinking sphere of collective bargaining cannot pro-
vide protection. The failure of unions to achieve and maintain majorities
is increasing the necessity for non-majority unions to play a significant
role. When unions cannot represent employees for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining, non-majority unions can represent employees for the
protection of individual employment rights.
Looking to potential future legislation, the most significant proposal
for non-majority unions is to provide all employees broad protection
from unjust discharge through procedures modeled on labor arbitra-
tion.46 Passage of such legislation, which is now supported by the AFL-
CIO, will provide an opportunity for unions in every workplace to repre-
sent middle and lower income workers who cannot afford a lawyer. At
the same time, it will give added protection to non-majority unions in
their other functions because employees vulnerable to discharge for en-
gaging in those activities will not have to rely on the narrow protection
and slow procedures of the Board. They will have the broad protection
of "just cause" and the faster procedures of arbitration.
III. OBSTACLES TO REALIZING THE POSSIBLE
The possibilities open to unions without majorities seem so obvious
that one must ask why unions have not done more to develop them. Per-
haps these possibilities are only ivy tower creations born of hope that
unions can find a new and needed role in our society. But I believe that
there are other factors which have made unions slow to explore these
possibilities.
46. See, for example, the Model Employment Termination Act adopted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Aug. 1991.
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First, unions seem to have been captured and imprisoned by the mis-
conception of the function of majority rule. The ultimate objective of
unions has been obtaining a collective agreement, and this can best be
achieved when the union obtains exclusive representation rights. Unions
have, therefore, understandably focused on the objective of obtaining this
statutory status. Preoccupation with this objective, which requires a ma-
jority, has generated the assumption that a union without a majority has
no purpose other than to obtain a majority. That assumption has become
so deeply rooted that unions have forgotten and been slow to remember
that unions can serve other useful though lesser functions in the
workplace.
So long as unions continued to grow and win elections, and so long
as the coverage of collective agreements expanded, this single-minded ob-
jective of obtaining majorities and making collective agreements was suf-
ficient. Only in 1985 did the AFL-CIO begin to suggest that unions
might serve the interests of employees who are not in organized bargain-
ing units. Even so, this suggestion consisted of only two paragraphs in a
thirty-four page booklet with the forward-looking title "The Changing
Situation of Workers and Their Unions."' 47 Nothing was said about the
potentialities of unions without majorities providing representation of
employees and their interests in the workplace. Today unions still seem
imprisoned by their unthinking assumption that without a majority a
union is nothing.48
Second, the typical union dues structure discourages allocating re-
sources where unions lack, and have no near prospect of achieving, a
majority. Dues are generally fixed at the level needed to support the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements including griev-
ance procedures and arbitration. Employees not covered by collective
agreements are not expected to remain active members and pay regular
dues. Indeed, some unions require withdrawal from the union when a
member leaves a unionized unit. The result is that no money is available
where the union lacks a majority. Only in 1985, did the AFL-CIO rec-
ommend new categories of "associate" membership with reduced dues.
The projected services to be provided included none of the in-plant repre-
sentation activities suggested here, and the use of the term "associate"
47. AFL-CIO Committee, REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORK 19-20 (1985).
48. The working assumption that without a majority a union has no value continues. In the
section on "Improving Organizing Activity," the Report states, "Before a union expends significant
resources on an organizing campaign, objective analysis should be done of the likelihood of success-
fully securing majority support and negotiating a first contract." Id. at 28.
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member betrays the assumption that they are not really union members
but purchasers of services.
The cost of supporting union activities where the union lacks a ma-
jority is substantial, though less than when there is an established bar-
gaining relationship with a collective agreement and a grievance
procedure with arbitration. The potential cost, however, seems more an
excuse than an answer. There has been no effort, to my knowledge, to
determine the level of dues necessary to support such activities by non-
majority unions. Nor has there been any inquiry as to the willingness of a
substantial number who supported the union during its organizing cam-
paign to contribute the time, effort and money necessary to make the
non-majority union effective.
Third, the assumption that non-majority unions have no function is
welcomed and reinforced by employers. It relieves them of any burden
in dealing collectively with their employees so long as they can prevent
the union from obtaining a majority. With the present legal rules and
climate they are able to discourage unions in seeking elections and win
half the time when unions go to a vote. By persuading half of their em-
ployees to vote "no union," they are able to assert that the others should
not exercise their section 7 rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the last twenty-five years the proportion of private sector
workers covered by collective agreements has steadily shrunk. For much
of that period the shrinking was disguised by an increase in the size of the
employed work force and the rapid growth of public sector unions. Dur-
ing the last ten years the slide has been steeper and more openly recog-
nized. This is, in my view, a tragic trend, for collective bargaining serves
vital social and political purposes. First, it serves economic justice by
creating a collective labor market with more equal bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees. Second, it thereby serves to reduce the
need for government intervention to protect employees from their eco-
nomic vulnerability, leaving regulation to market forces in that collective
market. Third, it serves to bring a measure of due process and democ-
racy to the workplace. We must either rebuild and expand collective
bargaining or find alternative structures to serve these social and political
purposes.
My purpose here has been to explore the potential of non-majority
unionism within our existing legal framework, not to belabor its limita-
tions. Obviously, a non-majority union is no substitute for an economi-
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cally strong union with complete, recognized bargaining rights. Even at
best, a non-majority union can provide less than half a loaf of economic
justice and industrial democracy. But a union without a majority can
provide workers a measure of protection, either by collective action or
legal representation. It can maintain the bonds between those who be-
lieve in unions and want to belong, and it can offer a continuing visible
presence in the workplace.
My focus has been on the potential role of the non-majority union as
representative of a minority of employees-the functions it can perform
in the absence of majority status. I have said nothing about how non-
majority unions can obtain majority status. But the union's demonstra-
tion of its continued concern for the rights of employees and its ability to
provide some protection of those rights can be the most persuasive path
to achieving majority status.
